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Malware is a relatively new term – but examples of malware have existed for decades.  
Simply put, malware is malicious software written for the purpose of causing computer-related 
damage.  Viruses, worms, trojans, spyware, adware, and targeted malicious code all fall under 
the umbrella of malware.  It’s clear that intentionally inflicting damage, whether in the real world 
or the digital world, is something that needs to be prevented.  However, the only certain way to 
eliminate the threat of malware would be to eradicate it completely, a noble yet certainly 
impossible task for any single person to undertake.  For the moment, malware is an everyday tool 
for criminals to inflict damage via denial of service attacks, data ransoms, and financial fraud.  
To understand the problem that malware causes, we need to look at who is writing malware, and 
why they are writing it. 
A wide variety of people have an interest in writing and proliferating malware.  The gains 
they are seeking may be personal, political, or financial.  There may be a direct monetary benefit 
associated with writing and releasing the malware (common in the financial industry), or there 
may be only negative monetary effects (lost revenue due to computer damages).  In either case, 
the act of one entity inflicting harm on another is grounds for involving law enforcement, 
regardless of the method used.  However, in “real life” scenarios, law enforcement has clearly 
defined roles and procedures for determining who, what, where, when, and why a crime has 
occurred.  There may be unknowns, but there are even procedures for handling those as well.  
When in the context of a computer-based crime, the number of possible perpetrators and attack 
vectors is staggering.  Nonetheless, law enforcement does have procedures for dealing with a 
number of computer-based crimes. 
When a computer-based crime has been committed, law enforcement must determine 
who was involved or affected, as well as which computers were involved or affected.  Through 
the course of law, computers may be seized and analyzed for evidence of the crime.  For most 
investigations of computer-based crimes, this analysis consists of searching for specific 
keywords or unusual data on those computers.  With the recent rise in number and severity of 
malware attacks, law enforcement is realizing the significance of both detecting the presence of 
malware, as well as determining which actions or effects the malware has on a computer and the 
computers to which it is connected.  With severe constraints on both equipment and labor, many 
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law enforcement agencies are looking for help to solve these malware-related cases.  
Additionally, the case load of many law enforcement organizations hinders many employees 
from gaining the expertise to perform thorough malware analysis (Professor James Goldman, 
Purdue University, personal communication, Summer 2009).  For the Indianapolis division of the 
FBI, the Purdue University Malware Research Team offers expertise and manpower to detect 
and analyze malware used in computer-based crimes. 
The Malware Research Team (herein MRT) operates as a plug-in step to the FBI’s 
process of investigating a computer based crime.  After collection of raw evidence from affected 
computers in the form of bit-for-bit copies or disk images, the investigator will search the 
computer for keywords or other specific evidence.   If malware is suspected to have played a role 
in the crime, the investigator will obviously have an interest in finding out which malware exists 
on the computer and what the role of that malware is.  To aid with this, the MRT is given a brief 
description of the case and a copy of the disk image (inputs to the system), performs a malware 
analysis process (to be described further in the review of literature), and returns a report to the 
FBI to assist them with solving the case. 
The Malware Research Team has an internal process that is used to examine cases in a 
predictable, sustainable, and repeatable manner.  This process consists of two major phases, 
which correspond to the primary requirements from the FBI:  detection (what malware exists?), 
and behavior analysis (what does that malware do?)  A flow chart detailing the MRT’s 
interaction with law enforcement, processing of the case, and reporting of results is shown below 




Figure 1 - Flowchart of current malware analysis process 
 
Statement of the Problem 
While the process shown above in Figure 1 works well for analyzing malware, at an 
implementation level there are a number of issues which hinder the ability of the MRT to process 
cases accurately and rapidly (James Goldman, personal communication, Summer 2009).  These 
6 
 
issues fall primarily into two categories:  reliability and scalability.  The malware analysis 
process and system need to be more reliable and more scalable than they are at present.  The 
following are a list of areas for improvement and which primary system aspect they affect. 
Area for Improvement Objective 
Affected 
Ability of system components to be 
validated 
Reliability 
Labor-intensity of current process Scalability 
Privacy of case-related data Reliability 
Integrity of reported results Reliability 




Significance of the Problem 
As mentioned above, two improvement categories exist:  reliability and scalability.  
Reliability is important to the Malware Research Team and its customers, because providing 
accurate information to law enforcement will help to ensure that is justice is served.  However, 
scalability is a far more important problem, because a more scalable system would allow a 
greater number of malware-related cases to be processed by the MRT, without the need for 
additional personnel with the expertise required for such investigation.  Additionally, a system 
that can scale via hardware instead of via added labor will allow case completion time to become 
more predictable and consistent.  At present, the human-oriented nature of the malware analysis 
process has resulted in approximately twelve cases being completed in a period of twelve months 
(James Goldman, personal communication, Summer 2009).  Designing a more scalable system 
will allow the MRT to process more cases, in less time, for both their existing customers and 
new customers in the future. 
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Statement of the Purpose 
To address the future reliability and scalability needs of the Malware Research Team, a 
new system will be designed to address the shortcomings described in the Statement of the 
Problem.  Upon completion of the project, a detailed design specification including the following 
will be delivered to the Malware Research Team:  
• Systems Context Diagram 
• System Activity Diagram 
• Use Case Scenarios / Narratives 
• System Objectives and Scope 
• System Architecture Diagram 
• Functional Requirements and Constraints 
• Development Strategy 
 
In addition to the design specification document, a document will be provided which 
details a method for evaluating the future system against the criteria (areas for improvement) 
described in the Statement of the Problem. 
Delimitations 
Reverse engineering and code analysis is very labor-intensive, and while it may be added 
to the MRT’s analysis process at some point, addressing these issues is outside of the scope of 
both the current system and the future system. 
Review of Literature 
Prior Research 
While published works describing malware and the analysis of malware are very 
widespread, works describing end-to-end systems for automated analysis of malware are 
comparatively scarce.  Therefore, much of this section will discuss prior research done by the 
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author in conjunction with the Malware Research Team.  This prior research constitutes a large 
body of knowledge about end-to-end malware analysis.  In effect, the details of what this system 
does (as well as what it does not do, or does not do well) will feed into the requirements 
gathering process for the proposed system. 
A good way to look at the scope of work done by the MRT is to look at the malware 
analysis process first as a “black box,” and examine the inputs and outputs of the system before 
analyzing the process in detail.  Two things need to be provided by the end-user who is utilizing 
the MRT: 
• Case description – background information, official write-ups, suspected attack vectors, 
personnel interviews (if available). 
• Case materials – image or other bit-for-bit copy of affected disk drives, or any other 
digital media needing analysis. 
In return, the MRT provides the following: 
• Case report – summary of findings (what malware, effects of malware) as well as detailed 
descriptions of each malware found. 
These are important points to bear in mind while examining the process that the MRT 
currently utilizes – every action should be traceable to the final objective of reporting the 
malware found on one or more targets. 
 
Figure 2 - Malware timeline showing roles and research focus (Goldman, et al, 2009) 
As shown in Figure 1 in the introduction of this document, two distinct sub-processes 
occur during the overall malware analysis process, detection and analysis.  These two processes 
correspond to three phases of the malware timeline, shown in Figure 2:  scanning and 
identification, isolation and extraction, and behavior analysis.  Also shown in the malware 
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timeline is how creators and distributors of malware and law enforcement relate to the overall 
lifecycle of malware analysis. 
The first sub-process from Figure 1 to be examined is detection of malware on the target.  
Fortunately, there is plenty of off-the-shelf software available for malware detection.  Companies 
like Symantec, McAfee, AVG, and many others produce both free and commercial anti-virus, 
anti-spyware, and anti-malware applications, which receive frequent updates for catching the 
latest malware “in the wild.”  Knowing this, an obvious approach would be to install a piece of 
anti-malware software, attach the target media, scan it for malware, and record the results.  
However, a number of issues exist which must be considered: 
• False positives / negatives – what if the selected anti-malware tool falsely detects 
malware, or misses malware that exists? 
• Preservation of target media – what if the selected anti-malware tool automatically 
removes any found malware (preventing later extraction), or otherwise modifies the 
contents of the target? 
• Scalability – how many concurrent scans can one piece of MRT hardware perform? 
• Security – what is preventing any malware on the target from corrupting or infecting the 
hardware on which the scan is being performed? 
 
These issues limit the speed at which the detection process can be completed.  However, 
the MRT has utilized various tools to address each one of these issues, which are discussed in the 
table below. 
 
Table 1 - Summary of current detection process issues 
Problem Solution Reasoning 
False positives/negatives Multiple scanning tools Scanning with multiple tools limits the 
probably of a false positive or negative, 
via correlation of multiple results. 
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Media preservation Virtualization / virtual 
disk 
Instead of a physical disk, a disk image 
representing a bit-for-bit copy of the 
original media is used.  This image can 
be copied for easy backup, or marked 
read-only to prevent modification. 
Scalability Virtualization Virtualization allows multiple operating 
systems to execute within a host 
operating system. 
Security of host Virtualization Virtualization also isolates the virtualized 
“guest” operating systems from each 
other as well as from the host, preventing 
damage to anything outside of the guest. 
 
Even with the solutions to these problems that the current MRT detection process uses, 
there are still some limitations and shortcomings which need to be examined.  These limitations 
were described earlier in this document as “areas for improvement.”  Below, each area and the 
specific problem will be discussed. 
• Ability of system components to be validated – although the false positive/negative issue 
is resolved by using multiple tools, there is still a possibility of a user not following 
procedures correctly, which could cause inaccurate results. 
• Labor-intensity of current process – the user who is performing the detection process 
must frequently monitor the state of in-progress scans, and manually handle result 
collection and error correction throughout the process. 
• Privacy of case-related data – scanning reports need to be copied to a user’s computer for 




• Integrity of reported results – the reported results have to be correlated by hand, using (at 
best) a word processor to organize and condense scanning report from multiple software 
tools. 
• Frequency and severity of human errors – related to validation ability, there is presently 
no way to ensure that a human mistakes do not happen, or that they are detected when 
they do happen. 
 
Table 2 - Summary of solutions for detection process issues 
Problem Solution Reasoning 
Ability of system 




Taking a systems approach and 
redesigning the detection system as 
interoperable parts will allow each 
segment to be independently verified. 
Labor-intensity of 
current process 
Automation Automation will reduce the repetitive 
prepare-scan-collect process into a one-
step “click and forget” process. 
Privacy of case-related 
data 
Automation Automation prevents human contact with 
relevant data from the scanning process, 
allowing better control over that 
information. 
Integrity of reported 
results 
Automation Additionally, if the data cannot be easily 
or accidentally accessed by a human, it 
cannot be easily changed either, 
preserving integrity 
Frequency and severity 
of human errors 
Automation Eliminating the human factor from the 





As seen, a crucial feature of a new system will be automation – this solves many of the 
problems with accuracy, integrity, privacy, and validation ability which exist currently.  
However, at this point only the first half of the process has been examined – the detection and 
accurate identification of malware.  Once malware has been determined to exist on the target 
media, a second process is used to analyze the behavior of that malware. 
Although the detection of malware uses software that many computer users are well aware of, 
malware analysis is much more specialized.  A number of online submission-based websites 
exist which will accept uploaded malware, execute this malware in a controlled and monitored 
environment (often using virtualization), and then return details about how the malware affected 
its environment while it executed.  Examples of these sites are CWsandbox and Norman 
Malware Analyzer.  A simple approach for malware analysis would be to upload malware to an 
online analysis service, and then read the results afterwards.  This approach causes a number of 
problems, detailed below. 
• False positives / negatives – what if the selected malware analysis service falsely detects 
an executable as malware, or isn’t able to detect an executable as malware?  
• Labor-intensity of current process – what if the malware analysis service doesn’t actually 
make a malware-or-not determination, but only provides information for the user? 
• Privacy of case-related data – clearly an online submission service is requiring malware 
(from active cases) to be sent over the Internet and stored (if only temporarily) on the 
computer performing the analysis. 
• Integrity of reported results – there is no way to be certain that the results from a malware 
analysis service were not modified in transit, or that the results are mixed up with another 
concurrent analysis. 
• Frequency and severity of human errors – a human could submit the wrong piece of 




The MRT is aware of these problems, but many of them are side-effects from relying on 
a third party analysis service.  Because of the lack of control over these services as well as a lack 
of validation ability, only one of these problems can presently be addressed: 
 
Table 3 - Presently-addressed issues with analysis process 
Problem Solution Reasoning 




Submitting suspected malware to 
multiple analysis services limits the 
probably of a false positive or negative, 
via correlation of multiple results. 
 
To summarize - the current MRT malware detection process has in some way addressed 
many of the initial concerns, except for scalability.  However, the analysis process has yet to 
address many of the concerns described above.  It will be the goal of the new system to solve 
these remaining issues. 
 
Table 4 - Remaining issues with analysis process to be solved 
Problem Solution Reasoning 
Labor-intensity of 
current process 
Automation Automation will reduce the repetitive 
prepare-scan-collect process into a one-
step “click and forget” process. 
Privacy of case-related 
data 
Use private analysis 
service 
Implement a local version of an online 
malware analysis service. 
Integrity of reported 
results 
Automation, Use private 
analysis service 
Perform analysis locally, and also prevent 
human interaction with the analysis 
process. 
Frequency and severity Automation Eliminating the human factor from the 
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of human errors process will reduce the possibility of 
human error. 
 
Effects of Automation 
Not surprisingly, automation is a large part of the solution for making the analysis 
process work more smoothly.  However, a key point is the introduction of a private analysis 
service.  This service would work much like an online service such as CWsandbox, but would 
run on local hardware in a secure and controlled environment.  This provides a number of 
improvements in the areas of privacy and validation ability, but also makes it substantially easier 
to tie into for automation purposes.  Scalability also becomes easier to achieve. 
To understand the importance of automation on the case-work that the Malware Research 
Team performs, it’s crucial to look at the balance of time between user interaction (a human 
physically interacting with the system) and system wait time (wall clock hours the system uses to 
perform “background” tasks).  Shown below is a linear graph of the estimated time for a typical 
case, in both the detection and analysis processes.  The figures used for the time study graphs in 
this proposal were provided by the Malware Research Team in Fall 2009 for a case which is 
representative of typical malware analysis cases. 
 
Figure 3 - Time study of typical detection process 
The numeric callouts on the time study illustrations denote what the user or the system 
was doing during that span of time.  Red areas indicate time spent by a human to interact with 
the system and configure it for the detection process.  Blue areas indicate time spent waiting for 




1. (interaction) Reading case information, setting up a work environment, and beginning to 
copy the disk image into the system for analysis. 
2. (wait) Waiting on the system to copy the disk image. 
3. (interaction) Configuring the first detection tool and beginning the first detection scan. 
4. (wait) Waiting for the detection tool to scan the disk image for malware. 
5. (interaction) Collecting results from the previous scan, configuring the next detection tool 
and beginning the next detection scan. 
(steps 4 and 5 are repeated for each malware detection tool that is used) 
6. (interaction) Collecting results from the final scan, correlating those results to eliminate 
false positives and negatives, and compiling a malware inventory report. 
 
Overall, the red areas represent nearly 3 hours of user interaction time required to 
complete a multi-tool detection run on a single malware-related case.  Worse yet, these 3 hours 
do not occur sequentially – instead a user must come back every few hours to check on the status 
of the previous scan and begin the next scan.  In total, the red areas represent 5 instances of user 
interaction that would ideally be eliminated, by having the user interact with the system only at 
the beginning and end of the detection process.  The blue areas represent over 9 ½ hours of time 
spent waiting on the system.  And again, this time is sequential – detection scans are not 
executed concurrently. 
Although the overall wall clock time of 12 ½ hours may seem daunting, for most 
purposes it is irrelevant.  The key factors are the number of times the user needs to interact with 
the system, and the overall time that a user needs to interact with the system.  These are the 
important figures which need to be reduced, ideally reducing number of interaction points to 2 
(beginning and end) and reducing overall interaction time to half of its present value (1.5 hours). 
However, the illustration above only shows part of the story.  Following the detection 
process and the creation of a malware inventory, a decision is made:  if the detection process 
yields no detected malware, then the Malware Research Team may opt to investigate the system 
manually (time-consuming), or otherwise abandon the process and report that no malware was 





Figure 4 - Post-detection decision-making process 
The analysis process is in-depth and time-consuming, similar to the detection process, but 
there is a difference in the relationship between interaction time and wait time.  Whereas the 
detection process features several large chunks of work to be done (waiting for detection tools to 
complete their scans), the analysis process features relatively quick pieces of work that need to 
be completed on all of the malware listed in the malware inventory report.  From discussions 
with members of the MRT (Fall 2009), a typical case may have over a dozen pieces of malware 
requiring analysis, with up to three separate online analysis services.  As shown below, the 
analysis process looks significantly different when examining time usage. 
 
Figure 5 - Time study of typical analysis process 
The striking difference between the two figures has to do with units of work and their 
relative size.  Scanning a typical multi-gigabyte disk image with a detection tool takes a 
significant amount of time.  Submitting a piece of malware (generally less than one-hundred 
kilobytes) to an online analysis service takes on the order of minutes to complete.  However, 
several minutes are also required to prepare the sample, and several more are required to collect 




1. (interaction) User must interact with the system, view the malware inventory report 
(created in the detection process), and then prepare an environment to extract malware 
from the target system and submit it for analysis. 
2. In this example, twelve pieces of malware were found, so in sequence, each one is 
extracted from the target system, and then submitted to an online analysis service via the 
web (interaction).  The analysis service processes the malware sample (wait), and notifies 
the user when complete so that the results can be acquired and stored in an organized 
manner (interaction).  This process is repeated for each analysis service being used. 
3. (interaction) After all of the malware samples have been analyzed by all of the desired 
analysis services, the individual malware reports from each service must be correlated.  
This forms the basis of the final report which is returned to the requestor of MRT’s 
services. 
 
By comparison to the detection process, the analysis process is significantly less 
demanding in terms of elapsed, wall clock time.  However, the demand on the user to constantly 
extract malware, submit samples, and retrieve results is much more taxing than in the detection 
process.  Overall system wait time is estimated at a little over 2 hours.  However, user interaction 
time is staggering at nearly 5 hours, with 35 separate interaction points, only minutes apart from 
each other.  Not only is this level of required interaction tiresome and frustrating for the user 
performing the work, it offers many opportunities for human error.  The sequential nature of the 
process represents a system that could be optimized through concurrent activities. 
 
Private Analysis 
As mentioned in the Prior Research section, the current process for malware detection 
analysis relies on many third party applications and services.  In theory this could be avoided by 
only utilizing local, homegrown software for detection and analysis.  Practically, the Malware 
Research Team does not have the resources for this, and so dependence on third party systems is 
necessary.  The risk of incorrect results from third party applications is mitigated by utilizing 
multiple sources, which helps to reduce false positives and false negatives.  However, the risk of 
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confidential information exposure to third parties can only be addressed through the use of 
localized, private tools. 
For the malware analysis process, the MRT currently relies on online services such as 
CWsandbox, Norman Malware Analyzer, and ThreatExpert.  However, a few projects exist 
which aim to provide practical and accurate malware analysis on a local scale.  One of the 
original projects for malware analysis is known as Truman (Stewart, 2009).  It is known as the 
“reusable unknown malware analysis net.”  The premise is that using two computers (one 
controller and one drone), a known disk image is loaded onto the drone and populated with a 
single piece of target malware.  The drone contains software for recording how the operating 
system environment changes (due to the actions of the malware), and those changes are reported 
back to the controller. 
Truman, being an open-source project, has been adopted and expanded upon to include 
additional functionality.  One implementation is “Building an Automated Behavioral Malware 
Analysis Environment using Open Source Software,” by Jim Clausing (2009).  Clausing’s 
employment with AT&T meant that when he discovered malware local to their environment, he 
did not have the ability or right to submit that malware to online analysis services.  This 
predicament is very similar to the one the Malware Research Team has.  Developing a private 
analysis service such as the one described in the Clausing paper is the best way to preserve the 
integrity and privacy of malware samples, while still receiving a detailed analysis of a malware’s 
behavior. 
Additionally, the MRT has found recently that the behavior reports from many of the 
online analysis services are lacking in detail that they used to provide.  Clearly, for such a job as 
determining the exact behavior of malware, excruciating details are important.  Pieces of 
information such as attempted network connections, file modifications, registry modifications, 
and even individual Windows API calls are all pieces to the puzzle that can determine what a 
piece of malware is attempting to do.  Furthermore, a private analysis service based on open 
source software has many more options for integration and automation than a third party service, 
and these options will not be subject to change on another company’s whim.  The private 
analysis service will be a crucial portion of the analysis phase of the MRT’s malware detection 




The main deliverable for this directed project is a systems design detailing a proposed 
system for improving, automating, and solving existing problems within the current malware 
analysis system.  A formal systems development methodology will be followed, consisting 
primarily of a document detailing the architecture, systems context, and technical requirements 
of the proposed system.  Personal communications with Jeffrey Brewer (Purdue University, Fall 
2009) have formed the basis for understanding the “state of the art” of systems development 
strategies.  Use cases will provide evidence of the various interactions that users need to have 
with the system, and will shape the desired state of the system after completion.  It is important 
to note that actual software will NOT be part of the deliverable for this directed project. 
In systems design, and particularly software design, a common methodology for the 
development of a new system is the Systems Development Life Cycle, or SDLC (Satzinger, et al, 
2002).  The SDLC contains the following phases of systems development: 
• Planning – determine the purpose of the system. 
• Analysis – determine what the system needs to do, the goals for the system and how to 
determine if those goals have been met. 
• Design – determine how the system will work, what the overall architecture is, and 
determine what steps would need to be taken to construct an actual system. 
• Implementation – using the existing design, construct a system to meet the requirements 
of the project. 
• Testing – establish that the constructed system actually does meet the requirements 
detailed in the design. 
• Maintenance – fix bugs in the system, which are essentially differences between the 
design (requirements) and the constructed system (reality).  As the design inevitably 
changes, update the actual system to match these changes. 
As mentioned, this project is not a software construction project, but instead is a software 
design project.  The SDLC will be followed through the first three steps.  This document 
constitutes the “planning” phase of the SDLC, as it is discussing the purpose of the system.  It 
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begins to address the “analysis” phase, as it has discussed gaps between the current system and 
the desired system (problems and limitations), which will be used to determine if the proposed 
system has met its goals.  The primary deliverable of the directed project will consist of the 
remainder of the “analysis” phase and the entire “design” phase.  The goal is to provide a 
technically complete design which would be sufficient to guide someone through software 
construction, without being so specific as to lock a developer into a technology of set of 
technologies.  Essentially, the directed project will provide a roadmap for development of the 
automated malware detection and analysis system.  The final step of the project will be to 
validate the design against the current-state challenges identified in Table 2 and Table 4. 




Systems Context Diagram 
 
 
System Administrators – allowed to add and remove users from the system in order to manage 
and control access to use it. 
Malware Researchers – primary actors in the context of the system, will configure cases for 
analysis and retrieve final analysis reports when completed. 
Customers – drivers and motivation for the system, will provide images to researchers and 
retrieve final reports when completed. 
File Store – external resource (pre-existing to the system) that provides the actual disk images to 



































Primary System Actor:  
  
Description: This use case describes the process of a malware researcher entering 
and loading a new disk image for analysis with the system. 
Pre-condition: Target disk image has been copied to file store. 
  
Typical Course of 
Events: 
1) Researcher authenticates to analysis system. 
 2) System validates researcher’s credentials. 
 3) Researcher adds new case file to system. 
 4) System prompts for case description and location of target disk 
image. 
 5) Researcher provides case background, supporting information, 
and location of disk image. 
 6) System queues pending analysis job. 
 7) System notifies researcher when analysis is complete. 
  
Alternate Courses: 2) System rejects researcher’s credentials, access is denied. 
 6) System cannot locate disk image, analysis job is not added. 
  
Conclusion: This use case concludes when a researcher has been notified that his or 
her analysis job is complete. 









Primary System Actor:  
  
Description: This use case describes the process of a malware researcher monitoring 
in-progress jobs and estimation of completion. 
Pre-condition: Analysis has begun on one or more disk images. 
  
Typical Course of 
Events: 
1) Researcher authenticates to analysis system. 
 2) System validates researcher’s credentials. 
 3) Researcher begins job monitoring 
 4) System polls processing nodes for current job execution status. 
 5) System uses job information to calculate a percentage completion 
estimate. 
  
Alternate Courses: 2) System rejects researcher’s credentials, access is denied. 
  
Conclusion: This use case concludes when a researcher is finished monitoring job 
status. 










Primary System Actor:  
  
Description: This use case describes the process of a malware researcher generating 
and receiving a report detailing the results of malware analysis. 
Pre-condition: Analysis has been completed on the desired disk image and the 
researcher has been notified. 
  
Typical Course of 
Events: 
1) Researcher authenticates to analysis system. 
 2) System validates researcher’s credentials. 
 3) Researcher selects desired image/case. 
 4) Researcher issues command to retrieve report. 
 5) System polls analysis records and builds report detailing findings, 
then delivers it to the researcher. 
  
Alternate Courses: 2) System rejects researcher’s credentials, access is denied. 
 4) System cannot generate report because analysis has not been 
completed. 
  
Conclusion: This use case concludes when a researcher has received the report for a 
given analysis. 









Primary System Actor:  
  
Description: This use case describes the process of the system administrator adding 
a new account to the system. 
Pre-condition: Desired username and initial password have been selected. 
  
Typical Course of 
Events: 
1) Administrator authenticates to analysis system. 
 2) System validates administrator’s credentials. 
 3) Administrator issues command to add new user. 
 4) Administrator enters desired username, initial password, and 
access level (Researcher or Administrator). 
 5) System verifies username is not in use. 
 6) System verifies password meets requirements. 
 7) System creates new account and notifies administrator of 
completion. 
  
Alternate Courses: 2) System rejects administrator’s credentials, access is denied. 
 5) System cannot create account because username is already used. 
 6) System cannot create account because password is too simple. 
  
Conclusion: This use case concludes when the new account has been successfully 
created. 










Primary System Actor:  
  
Description: This use case describes the process of the system administrator 
removing a user account from the system. 
Pre-condition: User no longer needs access to the system. 
  
Typical Course of 
Events: 
1) Administrator authenticates to analysis system. 
 2) System validates administrator’s credentials. 
 3) Administrator issues command to remove user. 
 4) System verifies that administrator wants to remove account. 
 5) Administrator confirms or denies deletion. 
 6) System removes account. 
  
Alternate Courses: 2) System rejects administrator’s credentials, access is denied. 
 6) System does not remove account. 
  







The malware analysis system has a number of objectives, which were determined by 
analyzing the shortfalls of the existing process.  Many of these shortfalls are described in the 
Prior Research section, as these limitations are the sole reason for developing a new system. 
The primary objective of the new system is to conserve time.  This means that given an 
acceptable input, the least amount of both system (CPU) and user (personnel) time should be 
used to arrive at the desired output.  Conserving system time in terms of overall CPU hours will 
be difficult, as the problems being solved by the malware analysis system are complex and 
require significant processing power to complete.  However, wall clock time spent on system 
processing can be reduced by utilizing more powerful equipment and “scaling out,” e.g. having 
multiple, similar systems work on tasks in parallel.  Therefore, scalability is one of the secondary 
objectives of the system. 
Conserving user time comes down to two separate factors.  Some portions of the analysis 
process will always require human interaction and decision making.  Primarily this refers to the 
final stages of the malware analysis process where results are being analyzed for correlation and 
unusual findings.  However, in the current analysis process there are many “boring” stages where 
a user must interact with the system to start different stages and perform menial set-up tasks to 
keep the analysis process running.  This type of time expense should be eliminated via 
automation which is another secondary objective of the system. 
Another factor affecting scalability is that of independent tasks.  For instance, the 
detection phase of analyzing a malware case consists of processing the same case data with 
multiple anti-virus or anti-malware tools.  Other than the data they are operating on, each anti-
virus tool is independent from the others.  This indicates an opportunity for these tasks to be 
completed in parallel.  Parallel computation means that at minimum the same amount of compute 
time will be used to arrive at the solution, but because the work is being done concurrently across 
multiple computers, the wall clock time required will be reduced.  The difference in process flow 




Figure 6 - Sequential vs. concurrent processing of malware cases 
The foundation for scalability exists in the present system through the use of 
virtualization.  Virtualization allows multiple, isolated operating systems to run within a single 
piece of hardware.  This allows a more efficient use of hardware and provides a layer of 
abstraction for malware processing tasks to occur on any computer in a larger cluster.  However, 
at present there is no infrastructure for managing the hardware that does this processing, or for 
tracking the analysis tasks that the system has processed in the past or will process in the future. 
This limitation contributes to the other secondary objective, which is automation.  
Because the system cannot track its progress on analysis of a particular case, this work must be 
done manually by the users.  Copying disk images between hosts must be done manually.  
Starting virtual machines and running software to perform the analysis, and collecting and 
correlating results at the end must all be done by users.  Because of the level of effort required 
for the analysis of any particular case, both user time and system time increase not only in 
relation to the complexity of the average malware case, but with the total number of malware 
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cases that need to be analyzed.  Therefore, to serve the primary objective of the project, user 
interaction with the system should be eliminated as much as possible. 
Other Objectives 
At present, during the malware behavior analysis phase, samples are submitted (by users) 
to online analysis services.  This poses a problem for certain types of cases where privacy is 
paramount.  One objective not related to the primary objectives above is to secure all case-related 
information within the system and prevent it from being submitted to external entities.  The 
solution for this will be to design or implement an existing private analysis service.  One 
example of private analysis that was mentioned in the review of literature was the Truman 
sandnet. 
Limitations 
Although not directly mentioned, the Malware Research Team has a need for a case 
management system that will store case data, additional resources from wherever the case 
originated (FBI case file notes, for instance), results from analysis processes as well as user 
generated insights and conclusions.  While the database that will power the analysis system is a 
natural location for such a case management system, it is being considered outside the scope of 
this project.  Instead, this project will focus on the “core business” of generating malware reports 
from submitted disk images. 
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System Architecture Diagram 
 
The items depicted above represent logical components of the system; their physical 
location is intentionally not described.  Due to the desired scalability of the system, it is 
presumed that these components can and will exist anywhere. 
Workflow 
• A disk image for a new case to be analyzed is copied to the File Store. 
• Using the web-based Management Interface, information about the case (including the 
location of the image) is entered into the Database. 
• The Analysis Coordinator serves as the master node for the operation of the analysis 
system.  Upon seeing a new case, it determines which sub-tasks need to be completed. 
• Tasks are distributed to the Worker Nodes for processing. 
• The Worker Nodes access resources from the File Store as necessary, copying resources 
like disk images locally for processing. 




• The Analysis Coordinator performs final cleanup tasks and updates the Database with the 
results. 
Functional Requirements 
• The system shall use a relational database to store input metadata, in-progress operational 
data, and completed results. 
• The system shall provide a secured user interface for entering new cases into the system, 
as well as for generating reports about completed cases. 
• An administrative interface shall be provided for management of users within the system. 
• Analysis of cases should be coordinated by a single machine/entity, which is responsible 
for dividing workload among one or more “worker” machines. 
• Independent tasks within the detection and analysis phases shall be executed 
concurrently, saving wall clock time and yielding a quicker turnaround time on case 
results. 
• Analysis shall consist of two phases, to be completed sequentially:  detection of malware, 
and behavioral analysis of malware. 
• The detection phase should at minumum consist of the following steps.  These steps will 
be completed once for each malware detection tool that is used, and will be able to 
execute concurrently on multiple worker machines: 
o Copy active case’s disk image from file store to local disk. 
o Locate existing virtual machine on local disk for selected malware detection tool 
(preconfigured). 
o Reconfigure virtual machine to use copied local disk image. 
o Boot up virtual machine. 
o Execute script within Windows virtual machine that will use automation to begin 
scanning disk image using chosen malware detection tool. 
o Following completion of malware detection, script should capture results and 
report them back to the analysis coordinator. 
o If detection phase is completed, remove disk image from local drive. 
• The analysis coordinator shall distribute detection phase work among worker machines 
until all chosen malware detection tools have been used. 
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• The analysis coordinator shall convert all results into a unified format and store those 
results in the database. 
• Using the stored results, the system shall identify individual pieces of suspected malware 
from the active case. 
• The analysis coordinator shall assign a task to a worker machine which will open the disk 
image, and extract all pieces of suspected malware to a temporary location. 
• The worker machine shall submit all of the suspected malware to the private analysis 
service (using an intermediate submission frontend). 
• The submission frontend shall process each piece of malware with the private analysis 
service, and upon receiving results they should be stored in the database with the other 
case information. 
• After all pieces of suspected malware have been behaviorally analyzed, the analysis 
coordinator shall create a final report of all malware found within the disk image and 
mark the case as “completed.” 
• The system shall notify the user who submitted the case that processing is complete. 
• The user shall be able to use the management interface to retrieve the final report of 
located malware. 
Development Strategy 
Put simply, the development strategy for this project should be agile.  Rather than 
focusing on reams of formal documentation describing how the system works, the focus should 
be on providing a self-documenting code base that can easily be extended by new developers.  
As the team who works with the malware analysis system will certainly morph and change over 
time, a lightweight code base that is easily modified will prove far more important than a far 
reaching set of documentation. 
Additionally, as new malware detection tools are released each year and better behavioral 
analysis services become available, there will be a definite need to revise the system to keep it up 
to date.  A modular, loosely-coupled approach should be taken so that new features and modules 
can be added onto the system without compromising the system as a whole.  Loose coupling 
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should also be used to enable unit testing and verification of individual modules before they 
become part of the primary code base. 
Although the representative design featured in this document focuses on a particular 
programming language, there is no reason that other languages should not be able to be used.  
This means that a focus should be placed on interoperable standards and cross-platform 
technologies.  At the code level, languages with strong object oriented features and concise 
syntax should be used, so that the focus is on what the code is accomplishing, not how it is doing 
it.  Standard analysis and design patterns, such as those written by the Gang of Four, shall be 
used properly to make the application more scalable, maintainable, and updatable. 
Agile development makes sense for a project of this size because requirements can be 
prioritized.  The first thing to be done is defining the data entities and attributes that the system 
must track.  Secondly, the analysis coordinator should be developed, in a generic fashion so that 
instead of the specialized tasks it will be performing in this system, it could dispatch tasks of any 
type to any system.  This guarantees that it will be expandable to meet the future needs of the 
project.  Following that, software for the worker machines should be developed.  At this point, 
the system will be capable of tracking and distributing arbitrary tasks among a cluster of 
machines. 
The most difficult part of any software development project is integrating with third 
parties.  In this project, virtualization technology is used to provide a safe, isolated, and scalable 
environment for both the execution of malware detection tools as well as the actual execution of 
malware for behavioral analysis.  Nearly all virtualization applications have APIs available to 
reconfigure and execute virtual machines and applications inside of them.  The software on 
worker nodes will be responsible for integrating with these virtual machines and running 
software, monitoring for faults and collecting results.  Again, these components should be 
loosely-coupled, so that they can be extracted and unit tested for correct behavior before 
integration into the rest of the software in the project. 
This unit testing carries with it an important benefit:  due to agile development, one entire 
development phase can be devoted to the completion of a single component of the system.  As 
long as everything is done to allow that component to work, there may be enough of the project 
completed to achieve a real benefit (some level of automation) even though the project as a 
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whole is not completed.  During the subsequent development phases as other components are 
completed and integrated, the system will become better and easier to use.  However, smaller 
benefits occur earlier in the process due to the agile method of “deliver early, deliver often.” 
In development of the centralized analysis coordinator as well as the worker machine 
software, open standards such as SOAP (or similar web services) should be used to avoid lock-in 
to a given vendor or technology.  In the future this would allow changes to operating systems or 
programming languages with minimal effort.  In the same vein, a management interface needs to 
be provided, which could simply be written to access the malware analysis database directly.  
Instead, providing an intermediate API would allow different interfaces to the system or even 
future automation potential with little to no cost to the original developer. 
Reference Implementation 
The preceding pages only detail the design of the desired system in a way that is abstract 
from technology.  However, all technologies required to develop the required components for 
this system presently exist.  Below is a reference implementation showing the physical layout of 




Figure 7 - Diagram of Windows/.NET-based reference implementation for automated malware analysis 
The reference implementation primarily uses Windows operating systems running on 
standard Intel-based x86 hardware.  The overall architecture consists of a master node which 
coordinates analysis across a larger group of worker nodes.  Each worker node runs VMware 
Server, a virtualization technology that will allow each node to virtually run many more isolated 
operating systems within. 
To begin, an administrator will use the Management Web Site to add a new researcher 
into the system.  Login account information is stored in the Microsoft SQL Server database.  
Next, a researcher can login to the web site, which will allow him or her to add a new case into 
the system.  The case information is also stored in the SQL database.  Any new case added must 
reference a disk image that exists on the File Store. 
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Upon seeing that a new case has been added to the database, the Analysis Coordination 
Service goes into action.  This service, written in C#, watches for changes in the database and 
communicates with the Analysis Gateway on each of the worker nodes, distributing tasks and 
facilitating the completion of the analysis.  The analysis coordinator will have knowledge of each 
of the worker nodes (configured in the database), and will be able to communicate with them via 
Windows Communication Foundation, a communications technology that is available to C# and 
is part of the Microsoft .NET Framework.  The advantage of writing the components of the 
system in C# is the support for Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools to be used 
to reverse engineer the design and provide accurate UML diagrams to supplement design 
documentation for the reference design. 
The Analysis Gateway runs on each worker node.  It is responsible for the following 
tasks: 
• Copy disk image from File Store to local disk, for performance reasons. 
• Configure the underlying virtualization technology (in this case VMware) using the VMware 
API.  This API will be used to create new virtual machines, start them, and stop them. 
As shown in diagram, each worker node runs VMware Server, which provides a base that 
can host multiple virtual machines (VMs).  Four are shown in the diagram, but many more could 
exist.  This ability to run multiple isolated operating systems on a single machine serves to scale 
the system up, allowing faster hardware to be used for increased capacity as demand for the 
system rises.  Because multiple worker nodes can be used to simultaneous process a case, or to 
even process altogether different cases, this allows the system to scale out.  More worker nodes 
can be purchased and added to the system as it grows. 
Each worker node will have two “template” VMs on it.  One will be for the detection 
phase of the analysis process, and the other will be for the behavioral analysis phase.  As shown, 
these two VMs are considerably different, as one is Windows-based and the other is Linux-
based.  The common factor is that some piece of common code is placed on the machine that will 
allow it to contact the Analysis Coordinator, receive tasks, and perform actions on the virtual 
system.  For the detection VM, this is the Detection Monitor, while for the analysis VM, it is the 
Analysis Monitor.  Linux has increasingly good support for C# applications, which makes it an 
acceptable choice for cross-platform use. 
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After the Analysis Gateway copies the disk image locally, it can create an instance of 
either the detection or analysis VMs, and configure that VM to reference the local disk image.  
After starting the VM and allowing it to “boot” up, the appropriate Monitor inside the VM will 
take over and communicate with the Analysis Coordinator directly.  The Monitor will begin 
execution of the desired detection or analysis software (McAfee, et al for detection, Truman for 
analysis).  Upon completion of the desired task, results are gathered and returned to the Analysis 
Coordinator, who can then signal the Analysis Gateway to shut down the VM and release any 
consumed resources. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
It should be clear that there is an opportunity for future research beyond the design 
presented in this paper.  This paper describes only a design and not the results of an actual 
implementation.  An excellent opportunity for future research would be to utilize the design 
presented here (and possibly even the reference implementation) and actually develop code to 
fulfill the roles described. 
 
Conclusions 
The goals of this project were to overcome limitations of the existing malware analysis 
system.  Limitations of the existing system included wasted time, and a lack of scalability and 
automation.  The new system is designed to meet the objectives outlined in this document, and to 
eliminate the limitations listed above.  Although it would have been prohibitively difficult to 
design such a system as well as implement it, the design presented here should provide a solid 
foundation for future work.  Additionally, it should serve as future evidence for gathering 
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